autonomy la gi

Tự ngôi nhà, tự động trị, tự động quyết – bọn chúng là những cơ hội dịch không giống nhau của autonomy, một định nghĩa thực hiện nền tảng mang lại vô số cuộc thảo luận đạo đức nghề nghiệp vô truyền thống lịch sử phương Tây, như ngôi nhà nghĩa tự tại, công lý, nhân quyền, hắn đức, đập phá bầu, trợ tử, hôn nhân gia đình đồng tính, cuộc chiến tranh, lăng xê, thậm chí là là bảo đảm an toàn môi trường xung quanh. Nó cũng là 1 chủ đề cần thiết trong tương đối nhiều nghành nghề dịch vụ không giống nhau: dạy dỗ, tư tưởng, chủ yếu trị, pháp lý,

Theo để ý của tôi, thông thường vô nghành nghề dịch vụ dạy dỗ và tư tưởng học tập tiếp tục dịch là “tự chủ”, triết học tập dịch là “tự trị”, hắn tế và pháp lý dịch là “tự quyết”. Tại trên đây tôi tiếp tục sử dụng cả tía cơ hội dịch.

Bạn đang xem: autonomy la gi

Dưới đấy là phiên bản lược dịch của nội dung bài viết Autonomy: Normative bên trên trang Bách khoa toàn thư Internet về Triết học tập. Quý khách hàng nào là ham muốn sở hữu tầm nhìn rất đầy đủ rộng lớn về tự động trị rất có thể phát âm nội dung bài viết bại.

Personal Autonomy

Without question, the majority of contemporary work on autonomy has centered on analyses of the nature and normativity of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy (also referred đồ sộ as ‘individual autonomy’) refers đồ sộ a psychological property, the possession of which enables agents đồ sộ reflect critically on their natures, preferences and ends, đồ sộ locate their most authentic commitments, and đồ sộ live consistently in accordance with these in the face of various forms of internal and external interference. Personally autonomous agents are said đồ sộ possess heightened capacities for self-control, introspection, independence of judgment, and critical reflection; and đồ sộ this extent personal autonomy is often put forth as an ideal of character or a virtue, the opposite of which is blind conformity, or not ‘being one’s own person.’

As mentioned above, personal autonomy has an essential relation đồ sộ authenticity: the personally autonomous agent is the agent who is effective in determining her life in accordance with her authentic self. Personal autonomy is thus constituted, on the one hand, by a cluster of related capacities (often termed ‘authenticity conditions’), centered on identifying one’s authentic nature or preferences and, on the other hand, by a cluster of capacities (often termed ‘competency conditions’) that are centered on being able effectively đồ sộ live in accordance with these throughout one’s life in the face of various recalcitrant foreign influences. These capacities may be possessed singly or in unison, and often require a considerable amount of life experience đồ sộ assume robust forms.

One of the most intractable problems surrounding personal autonomy concerns the analysis of the authentic self (the ‘self’ in ‘self-determination’, as it were).  Some philosophers have claimed that no such self exists; and indeed, some philosophers claim that no self exists at all (for an overview of these problems, see Friedman 2003 and Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000).  Most philosophers accept the possibility of the authentic self at least as a working hypothesis, however, and concentrate attention on the question of how authenticity is secured by an agent. The most popular and influential tài khoản is based on the work of Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin. According đồ sộ their ‘hierarchical’ tài khoản, agents validate the various commitments (beliefs, values, desires, and ví forth) that constitute their selves as their own by a process of reflective endorsement. On this tài khoản, agents are said đồ sộ possess first-order and second-order volitions. Our first-order volitions are what we want; and our second-order volitions are what we want đồ sộ want. According đồ sộ the hierarchical model, our first-order desires, commitments, and ví on are authentic when they are validated by being in harmony with our second-order volitions: that is, when we want what we want đồ sộ want. Following from this model, an agent is autonomous in relation đồ sộ a given object when the agent is able đồ sộ determine her first-order volitions (and corresponding behavior) by her second-order volitions. A simple example may help đồ sộ illustrate the model. Say that I am a smoker. Although I enjoy lighting up, I tự not reflectively endorse my smoking; I desire it, but I tự not want đồ sộ desire it. On the hierarchical model, smoking is not an aspect of my authentic self, because I tự not reflectively endorse it; and đồ sộ the extent that I am unable đồ sộ change my habits, I am not autonomous in relation đồ sộ smoking. Conversely, if I can bring my first-order volitions into harmony (or identity) with my second-order volition, then my desire is authentic because it is reflectively endorsed; and đồ sộ the extent that I can mold my behavior in accordance with my reflective will, I am autonomous in relation đồ sộ smoking.  Persons who possess the requisite capacities đồ sộ sườn authentic desires and effectively đồ sộ generally live in accordance with them are autonomous agents according đồ sộ this model (see Frankfurt 1971, 1999 and Dworkin 1988).

The hierarchical model remains–in outline, at least–the leading tài khoản of authenticity undergirding most contemporary accounts of personal autonomy, although it has been attacked on many fronts. The primary objection tendered against this tài khoản is ‘the problem of origins.’ As we have seen, authentic selfhood as reflective endorsement holds that my authentic self is the self that I reflectively ratify: the self that I endorse as expressing, in a deep sense, who I fundamentally am or wish đồ sộ be. The problem of origins arises when one attempts đồ sộ explain how this act of reflective endorsement actually constitutes a break from other-determination (that is, from foreign influence). For, could it not be the case that what appears đồ sộ u đồ sộ be an independent act of reflective endorsement is itself conditioned by other-determining factors and therefore ultimately an other-determined act? If this is the case, then it doesn’t seem that the possession of autonomy or the making of autonomous choices is possible. In short, the problem is how đồ sộ sustain an tài khoản of self-determination that is not threatened by the pervasive effects of other-determination (see Taylor 2005 for elaboration on the problem of origins and related sub-problems). Much work on theories of personal autonomy has been explicitly devoted đồ sộ addressing precisely these sorts of difficulties.

Besides analyzing and clarifying the authenticity conditions necessary for autonomy, philosophers have also worked on providing a thorough tài khoản of the competency conditions necessary for the presence of autonomy (see Meyers 1989, Mele 1993, and Berofsky 1995). Competency conditions, as we have seen, are those capacities or conditions that need đồ sộ be present in order for one đồ sộ be effective in living according đồ sộ one’s authentic self-conception in the face of various kinds of interference đồ sộ that over.  Examples of competency conditions include self-control, logical aptitude, instrumental rationality, resolve, temperance, calmness, and a good memory.

Xem thêm: truyện vụng trộm

In addition đồ sộ authenticity and competency conditions, many theories of personal autonomy require the presence of certain external enabling conditions: that is, external or environmental (social, legal, familial, and ví forth) conditions which are more phàn nàn less out of the agent’s control, but which must be in place in order for fully autonomous living đồ sộ be possible. Such enabling conditions include, for example, a modicum of social freedom, an array of substantive options for choice, the presence of authenticity-oriented social relations, and autonomy-supporting networks of social recognition and acknowledgment (see Raz 1986 and Anderson & Honneth 2005). Without these conditions, effective autonomous living is said by some đồ sộ be impossible, even where authenticity and competency conditions are robustly satisfied. Different autonomy theorists place different emphases on external enabling conditions. Some contend that external enabling is a necessary condition for autonomy (see Oshana 1998). Others hold that autonomy more properly concerns agential satisfaction of authenticity and competency conditions, regardless of whether the external environment allows for actual autonomous expression (see Christman 2007). Both views can claim some intuitive tư vấn. On the one hand, it is reasonable đồ sộ hold that it is only fitting đồ sộ điện thoại tư vấn a person ‘autonomous’ if that person is in fact effective in living according đồ sộ her authentic self-conception. Yet, it also makes sense đồ sộ điện thoại tư vấn persons ‘autonomous’ who have formed an authentic self-conception and possess the requisite competency conditions effectively đồ sộ express that self-conception, but happen đồ sộ lack the contingent socio-relational conditions that allow for the expression of that authentic self. A possible solution đồ sộ this impasse may be đồ sộ avoid seeking hard and fast borders đồ sộ the existence of autonomy, and say that autonomy is present in both cases, but is more robust where the proper external enabling conditions are in place.

The question of normative commitments associated with personal autonomy possession has also been a matter of some dispute. Many philosophers hold that autonomy is normatively content-neutral. According đồ sộ this tài khoản, one (or one’s commitments) can be autonomous regardless of the values one endorses. On this tài khoản, one could commit đồ sộ any kind of life–even the life of a slave–and still be autonomous (see, for example, Friedman 2003). Other philosophers hold that autonomy possession requires substantive normative constraints of some kind or other–at the very least, it is argued that one must value autonomy in order đồ sộ be truly autonomous (see Oshana 2003). As with the debate just mentioned, both sides of this debate can claim some intuitive support; this can be shown through the asking of opposing but seemingly equally compelling (apparently rhetorical) questions; namely, ‘Can’t one autonomously choose whatever one wants?’, and, ‘How can we điện thoại tư vấn someone autonomous who doesn’t value or seek autonomous living?’ One possible solution đồ sộ this debate is đồ sộ say that while almost any individual choice can be autonomous, persons cannot live autonomous lives as a whole without some commitment đồ sộ the value of autonomy.

Unlike moral and existentialist autonomy, personal autonomy is possessed in degrees, depending on the presence and strength of the constellation of internal capacities and external enabling conditions that make it possible. While not all persons possess personal autonomy, it is commonly claimed that virtually everyone–with the exception of the irredeemably pathological and the handicapped–possesses the capacity for personal autonomy. In addition, the links between personal autonomy possession and moral agency are usually said đồ sộ be thin at best. Even those who hold that personal autonomy possession requires substantive normative commitments of some kind (such as, for example, a commitment đồ sộ the value of autonomy itself), they usually hold that it is quite possible đồ sộ be an autonomous villain. Some philosophers have argued that personal autonomy possession requires the presence of normative competency conditions that effectively provide agents with the capacity đồ sộ distinguish right from wrong (see Wolf 1990), but this strong tài khoản is in general disfavor, and even if the tài khoản is correct, few would argue that this means that personally autonomous agents must also always act morally. In the face of this, one may wonder why autonomy-based claims are said đồ sộ generate demands of respect upon others. This question will be dealt with in more detail in section 4 below.

Lastly, a word should be given on the relation between personal autonomy and freedom (or liberty, which is here taken đồ sộ be synonymous with freedom). Although it is not uncommon đồ sộ find the terms ‘(personal) autonomy’ and ‘freedom’ used essentially synonymously, there are some important differences between them.

Xem thêm: trở thành mẹ kế của nam chính

More often phàn nàn not, đồ sộ claim that a person is không lấy phí is đồ sộ claim that she is negatively không lấy phí in the sense that she is not constrained by internal or external forces that hinder making a choice and executing it in action. There is a clear distinction between autonomy and negative freedom, however, given that autonomy refers đồ sộ the presence of a capacity for effective authentic living, and negative freedom refers đồ sộ a lack of constraints on action.  It is entirely possible for a person đồ sộ be không lấy phí in this negative sense but nonautonomous, or–on accounts that tự not require the presence of external enabling conditions for autonomy đồ sộ be present–for a person đồ sộ be autonomous but not (negatively) không lấy phí.

Some writers also speak of positive freedom, and here the connections with autonomy become much deeper. Speaking very generally, đồ sộ be không lấy phí in this sense is đồ sộ possess the abilities, capacities, knowledge, entitlements or skills necessary for the achievement of a given over. For example, I am only (positively) không lấy phí đồ sộ win an Olympic gold medal in archery if I am extremely skilled in the sport. Here it should be clear that one can be positively không lấy phí in many ways and yet not be autonomous. Some philosophers, however, following Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1948), have described positive freedom in such a way that it becomes basically synonymous with personal autonomy. Like autonomy, the conception of freedom that is operative in a given discussion can vary considerably; but more often phàn nàn not personal autonomy is distinguished from freedom by the necessary presence, in the former, of a connection đồ sộ the authenticity of the agent’s self-conception and life-plan–a connection that is usually not found in conceptions of freedom.

Autonomy as a Right

Lastly, autonomy is sometimes spoken of in a manner that is more directly normative phàn nàn descriptive. In political philosophy and bioethics especially, it is common đồ sộ find references đồ sộ persons as autonomous, where the autonomy referred đồ sộ is understood principally as a right đồ sộ self-determination. In these contexts, đồ sộ say that a person is autonomous is largely đồ sộ say that she has a right đồ sộ determine her life without interference from social or political authorities or forms of paternalism. Importantly, this right đồ sộ self-directed living is often said đồ sộ be possessed by persons by virtue either of their potential for autonomous living or of their inherent dignity as persons, but not by virtue of the presence of a developed and active capacity for autonomy (see Hill 1989). Some have argued that political rights (Ingram 1994) and even human rights generally (Richards 1989) are fundamentally based upon respect for the entitlements that attend possessing the capacity for autonomy.